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THE FIVE INDUSTRIES:OPERATIONS
AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
Each of the Liv. industries shos. ..sllcorporation. we
are studying is marked by peculiarities of itsown - icc-
nomic characteristic, thatdistinguish it sharply from
the others. The outstanding feature ofthe baking Indus-
try is the stable demand for it. product.The manutac-
tura ofman'a clothing is a particularly precaricusun-
dertaking,In comparisonwith other consuner goods in-
dustries furniture manufacture is stronglyinfluenced by
cyclical forces;reover, it. is closely correlated with
the construction industry, in which activitylagged dur-
ing the period covered by this study.The atone and clay
products industry has been undergoinga secular decline
in busines, during the past. few decades. Finally, the
production ofmachinetools,vital as it is tolarge-
scale heavy industry, is particularly sensitiv,to cycli-
cal forces; today it is of strategic militaryimportance
as well.
The present chapter will describe each ofthese in-
dustries in turn, J/ presenting a dossierof fiv, case
studies which should serve as a useful background for the
subsequent composit, analyses.The less general observa-
tions, particularly tha discussions of financialcharac-
teristics,are based on figure. pertainingonlyto the
corporations in the 1926 sa.piè that continued inopera-
tion through the period 1926-36.These corporations are
believed to be reasonably repr..entativ, of ll enter-
prises in theirrespective industries,Ifand it i. un-
likely that the successbiascauses any serious distor-
tion ol the general picture.Particular aspects of the
financial structure of these concerns,such as profita-
bility and liquidity, reveal sharp variationfrom suc-
cessful to unsuccessful companies.Generalizations on
other characteristics, however, such as the significance
of land andplant infinancial structure,y be equally
valid for surviving companies and those thatdiscontinue
business.Fi"a"tSL1 Corporsg1
A compifllthatsight. beregarded t.yptcai .
mal&fCtt'8
inany particular
of cour5 $marlabetrlCttot%In this chapt.r t
t..ptid,however,to present aroughsketch of
aompifl7 -itopSrott019physiCal apparirS
ciii structuli
- foreachof the fiveindtri.s ,..
.red.DsoIhiPi0nSof it. physicalappearance
t.ure ofit.iop.r$tiOnIare based ong.neralobssrv.tio
Itieconomic .tt&stt01ii describedlargely (to. cona
rpoii,COVITL"Ithe entirlindustT1.And it.. finanw
ChST.ct.ri.tica are
averages representingU. sample
porattofls thatremained inoperation over the 1926.
36 p.riod.The resultingcopO5it5picture is not ,.






me bakingindusti7,which i. here understood to
comprise small producersof breid, cake and piesbut to
exclude manufacturers
of biscuits and crackers, is cisr-
scteriaideconomically ba relatively local anddepend-
able rket.The smalldtus of the market is attrlha-
able to thebulk of th. productin comparisonwith co*,
and to its perishabilitY.Th. demand for bread (rca een
mercisl bakers ha.remained stable, both cyclically si
seasonally,in spits ofthe fact that there has bass s
secular decline inper capita.onau.ptton of wheat.Tb.
reasons why this contractionhas not beenreflected Is
sales are probablythe shiftfrom ho.. to factory bakW
and the increasein population.
The basic process of bread-making hasalways bees
simple.It is now generallyschenised, although inN
of the smallestcompaniesmanyoftheoperationsIN
stillnual.The development of dough-mixing diias$
continuous ovens and,particularly,bead-C%Itt.e sad
wrappers haschanged themechanicsof productionIO
what,but it did not effect any substantial $aviiip
of
laborduring the period covered bythis report./
Many small bakeries operate in their ownbitidiflh',
and most of the. are locatedin small anddima"s1
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coininities, leaving th. baking chainsand large coer-
cial bakeriesto predominate in the bigcities.This
tendency is evidentfromthe followingfigures,which
show,for cities of different size.,the average number
of vage-.arners in baking establishmentsin 1933 (rounded
off to the nearest whole number), andth. average value








that very smell bakeries,such as those in the present
sasple, are not found in the big citIes.On the contra-
ry, of the bakeri.s that employed nomorethan 5 wage-
earners in1933,mor. than a third were located in cities
with a population of 500,000or sore.
In what mey be called the typical smellbakery there
are likely to be several ovensand two or three bakers
withtheir assistants. / There are alsoa few cutting
and wrappingchjnea,perhaps operated by girls,and
possibly a delivery truck or two.1,Th. front of the
building may be devoted to a retailoutlet for some of
the baked goods.Th. bakery probably has contracts with
lccal grocery stores, calling for the deliveryof bread
the morning after baking.
Such a small bread-baking corporation would havean-
izal sales amounting to almost three times itstotal as-
sets. The current debts of the enterprise would beslight-
ly less than the current assets, and wouldconsist large-
ly of accounts payable to suppliersof flour and other
raw materials.The balance of current debt. would consist
of notes payable, due within ayear (probably bank loins
for the most part), and accruedexpeases for such items
as taxes, insurance and interest.The officers of this
fictitious corporation would receivesome $7000 in com-
bitad salaries, and another few thou5anddollars in cash
divid.ds, in a year such as 1936.f
1ti.n
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A. for the actualbaking cosp.ntss in our sasple,
ssv.ral of their financial characteristics (Table 2)are
explained by the dependability ofrkt demand for the
product.These coepanies' relativelystable volus. of Ui..and earnings obviously reflectsthesteady rket,
as do also their rathers'U net workingcapital and
relatively large lonu't.rm debt.2/$en abusiness is
conthacted largely on. cabasis, aid it. sales income rein. fairlyconstant,itsmargin of current assets
over currentliabilities cansafely beslender.Bvir-
I
-s1 10110 CCCIAU M1.nc.s.t
,d.id InCCSI 3t$tlItlal, tThovasMi of
D,11..r. .nd toP.rceiit of Total Asalt'.1926 aM 1936 i/
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Lieiii
Accowite 587 709 10 13
Ist.s pajabll 657 263 11
CtM?cIUValt UbUItLS 91 173 2 3
21 Total air.,I ltabllitiSl ___ J4 - Lu'u dIll
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tue of their general stability andtheir relatively heavy
fixed investment in land andplant, small bakingcompa- nies are more attractive tolong-t.ra lenders, particu.
larly mortgagor,, than smallcompan1ein other indus-
tries are likely to he.
Raw material and fuelcoats represent approximately
half th, value of products (atfactory selling prices) of
the baking industry. Th. chiefrawaterjal item is wheat
flour,f which, likeother agricultura' prokicts,under- went a sharpprice declineover the periodcovered by
this study.Th. importance of flourprices in the opera-
tionsof the baking companiesin the present sample 13
but inadequately indicated bythe size of these companies'
inventory holdings(about 10 percent. oftotal assets); a
bettar gauge of the significanceof this item is afforded
by the fact thatraw materialand fuel costs amount to
more than half the selling price.The stability of the
companies' operation,, the rapidturnover of their inven-
tory and th, ease with whichthey can obtain additional
supplies ezplain whytheir inventory holdingsare small
in relation tc the volume oftheir business.In 1936 the
sales of the81 baking companiesin the present sample
were 25 times their coshined inventory,a ratio more than
three times as large as thecorrespor.Jing figure for any
of the other industriesstudied here.Moreover, the bak-
ing companies' inventorywas composed almost entirely of
raw material, and supplies.For the companies that clas-
sified their inventory thevarious items represented the
following proportions oftotal classifiedinventory In
1936, and these proportionschanged very little over the
li-year period:./
wt.rtslu7d (ruport.j







In the baking industry laborcoats are not a partic-
ularly large item- about a fifthof the value of prod-
ucts.Diatribtaticn costs and depreciationtogether form'
a more important item:in 1936 depreciation, in relation
to the volume of business,was even larger for the sample
of bakeries than forthe sample of machine toolcompanies.
For the bread-bakingtndust.ras a whole about half the
value of output(at factory sellingprices) represents




The profits ofa business enterprisegenerally f1Lc tuste directly with itsvolume of business,larisl, I cause overheadexpenses are relatively inflexible. en sales volume 1. high,profit, are high,and vice Vera.sa. at there aretimes when Changesin costs arid price. IPIn- tervene to upsetthis relationshipbetween sales and W)rOf its.It is difttclt,to discuss, withany d.gr.. of mer- tMnty, thevarying COltand price situations thatC*)fl- fronted thetypicel small bakeryover the period 1926436. Its sates an4those jteriof expense(such a.depFdClP L tion) thatare customarilyitmeised on the income ure-
higier for largethan for sm&ll bakeries, and fpc
nies suCh as thosein the present. sample it is
percent. j/
The gross land and plantof thes. smafl
porations are dividedfairly evenly betweenbatldings
machinery.Almost all these Companies otheirov..,. arid frequently the buildingin which they°perat.
' the companies in thissample that showed the
their land and plant, th. constituentite*a
the following proportions of total classified isli
plant (groae) in 1936.fSince these
Fieascing SmaztCorpor5t.
25 (reported ..p.rmt.ly bSi Uthtnsry ang .eaIa 6 C
?urn,tture and tl.atur.s 2("
) fld iO(
had more than halt their fixed assets in thefOrm of estate it is not surprising that some 10percent ot t,i: total liabilities represented long-termoblig.tjo5 unusually large proportion for such smallmanufactu There werescarcelyany changes in the1and-aiid..p1, breakdown over the19-36period.







turn can be estimated from thepresent sample, butve- sents in rem met,rialandlabor COStSand inselling prices,which are especial]yimportant COisjderatjo,
st. be iflterredfromother data applicableto the entire
i:!ldustry.34i/
In 1926-29 the directrelationship between sales and profits seen. to ha,.been disturbed bya change in the
cost and pric, structure.As Tabi. 3 ihows for thesam-
ple studied here, the volumeof business increasedstead-.
ily fros 1926 through 1929,with no interru3tjon inthe
depression year192?.&atthe moveient,of'OttIcers' cosnaatjon,depreciajoand flour prices causednet income to fluctuat,over this period.The 1927 sales were the mostprofitableof this prosperity period,be-
cause then flour price./ droppedsharplywhile bread
prices held firm.ay1928 the i:icreases in officer,'
coIipensation arid in depreciationhad apparently offset
the fall in flour prices,for in thatyear pr3flts reced-
T.bl. .3 - $1 SAlI*O0IAfl0: S.1.ct.d 1'ss St.t..snt lt.s.,1.926...36/ Do11,,. figwi.. in lhosuas)
D'sIstlon .t 8,1. Z-
ice
c T tn2L!L- Ciatios k/2L!!11
1926$13,966 $661 $357 $58 $377 2.7 $217 1927 700 412 01 53 3.9 264 1920 15,034 754 438 44 313 2.1 210 1929 15,725 834 442 59 535 3.4 223 1926-299'2 Lt22Z .'49
1930 15,130 44? 41 300 2.0 238 1931 3.2,692 761 410 27 0.7 173 1932 10,216 616 390 21 -266 -2.6 77 1930-32 2.1w 1.263
19) 10,442 540 373 23-7 -0.4, 40 1934 12,400 534 34,9 22 -72 -0.6 41 1935 13,430 510 30 30 -26 -0.2 56 1936 5, 337 42 144 1.0 200 1933-36 s.!2 L!. iii .....i ..L
W Ms.4 os T1Uonogzsp15 (pr.vies.1y chad) ?.b1. 1-Ain £pp.ndii p. V Attsp anme tan's,ssinaja. of peofit,or losass fr's of r'sl 'slat..
LIlass than 0.05p.rc.nt.FieaacsaS..ii
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.4 to their1926 l.v.1.The s.cord sost prorit..
1929,alsO wasrkd by a colw'*rrontic,. Iii
dscrSasSIA flawpTlC11, hid h$ild have
profitable j t 1927 bed gt officer.'
tactlesS4 shsrpl$.Tbj'ouiOut this period th.*olaisli - 'es "P'in Qi,..
rtasdaiatios.i7.
Over the .,tir.p.riod 1926-36u ,,
.lou to lois led us. togain.They,, ,,
red very 4s1y, hvir, asis Icatmd
that for Lbs bakerS... utudi.d her. t.1.I.1 1.....,
tb. 11 7letl C5tO 01117 a11 frsctto of
it..1st lossesdonstappear wi1 1932, and
able only in thatwsr.Sal.. began to
and rose .herplyin19% and 1935. it eat lo.ssspur.
aist.d through 1935, avon thoughof fic.r.'
and 4.pr.ctstiosi cOfttinesdto declin.;the r.ss,q
w.rp tncr.ss.. in flour pita.., idtich rose $25(a
.1 in 1933, another $50 in 19%,and anoUisr$j,njj,
1935.r 1936 the.. .sall bsk.rs were cosfo,'iaIi
black again, officers'coenaatton was aitfl
.-1933 lav.l.. Sal.. in 1926 and 1936wars at Ui.
1.ve1, 7st eat inca.. (before officers' co1snsst,ö
predation and inco.s tasss) was 10.4 percent ofuslu k
th..arLy year and 7.7 percent in th. later.In vhs .1 th. fact that 1936flourprices were still imdsr tbsfr
1926 1..1, we saiL .zplain thisdifferential in petit,
p.r sal..dollarintsrasofthe lower Wiol.ssl. Wed pric.,and the bigh.r wags coats andtsxss,thet pri- v.1.1.4 in the lateryear.
The ownars and officers ofthea. sfl bakeries de oat sisabi.uaisas offic.r.' co.nsat ton an Cad dividend,.The coensat tonwithdrawals warerkdW their persistency.Dividend., however, fell oft j.tpJS'
in1931 and 1932, sndd.tnot rsthetrpre-dsprsssl )fl
l.v.1 until 1936.Lyon so, f on 1931 to the end of t period dividend,greatly exc..d.d the available ut Ii-
CO(after incots.$),constitutingin the aW'' a a heavy drainon the resources of thisgroup Of -
biker..lotall coenje,that suffered increased Is" COI*.tm,.d to pqdividends; but it 1.clear fion the It





















e5.nboy.' clothing menufacturers,in sharp
, contrast to the bakersdsscrib.d in the precedingsac-
tion, l.ad a precarious businesssztstenc..Especially
rk, is this tru. of s_il companies ilicsthose in our sample.
The owners' equity in theconcern isagr, and often
one or two bad seasons suffic. to place thebusin.s in
the hand, of creditor.,Styl. Change. are less Iaipor-
taut than in some other divisionsof thsappareltrade,
t but even for men's outerwear th. varietyof fabrics need-
., ed uswelly means that suiting.suet be woven to order.
ofTh insecurityof the Smell-seal.anufscturer of men's
- clothing ii attsst.d by the fact thatof the 191 compa- sic.picked at random in the 1926 drawin.gonly 46 contin- med in sstsncethrough 1936. j/ Thusitis not sur-
prising to find that in these companie,the owner' a Ii-
usnotal interest islea. thanin other s_fl menufactur-
h lug enterprise..The owner obtain. meet of thenecessary
raw material. and equipment on credit,and as a result
keeps hi. loss notsuch merethan that of the creditors
in case of receivership, even though thelatter.'claims
s have priority over hi. own. Although he is likelyto fail
s-quickly,the entrepreneur in thi. business rebounds with
In astonishing agility:several menths after a forced iiq-
t uldation hey be beck in business, under a new company
name and with a few thousanddollar,borrowed from a
a friend or relative, /
For son. years theail manufacturer has been ad-
1 vsr.eiy affected the growth of chain., such as Bond,
$ Howard and Rtchn, shich tie up the retail outletsand
w isad to .t.Atsr vertical integratIon on the part ofother
laxg. manufacturers.fIn New York ar*I Chicago- from
shich the bulk of our sample was drawn- the s_li units
p have been harder hit the., difficulties than in cen-
)n tars like Holtimure, Philadelphia and St. Louis./ In
addition, there ii evidence thatthe proportion of the CLmIr'sdollar spent for men's clothing (suits, coats
I i and overcoat.) has been declining secularly, partlyas a
P result of an increase in sportswear (not generally med.
in the wan'. clothing factories us are studying).
eu'. clothing 1. a consumer good, but since it is
semi-durable, empenditures thereon areemporariiy post-
p ponable. MDreover, family buying habit. are such thatFinaNcing SmallCorort1
the children5clothing reqsair.sntsare met fjp
t.
other'second, and the father'. last. p. this
the .me' $clothing indasti7 is quickly b71
clica]. contractionin generalbusiness.As t most
vp..
parel lines, seasonalfluctuationsin iiiduati7
sharp, thetWObuySSSof the year bej
fall.3J
A man'. clothing cc(icern mor. or lees tpj
carissinou .ale would have totil
$70,000, about 85 percentof Wiicb wouldconsist
vsitozy,Cuitr$' accounts andnotesreCeiyabl.
'Iunt of cash and go'veriisnt bonü.me t
cl'4me upon these asset. would be divided fairly .,
betw.me the creditors and theners, the forai hO1din
shortter. claims almost .xclusiv.ly. ma csr.1
nual isles would aunt toa figurebout three itmiti total assets.In a year such as 1936 the Salarjspj
to officers would sggrsgat. some $10,000, azthis oui
can.r. would receive in additionabout $2000 incash di idends, representing almost .11 of the net
ably there would be no nor. than two full-uasofficer,, and the. the compensation of each would be fairlyck quate.(
Table4 revss]..that the investmentof the mell aifacturmes in the present saspi. is largelyin curri
assets. Fron this very meagre outlayon land and p1st w y iiifr that most Of thise Canjes eitherf$!d mt their tailoring to contractfactories or rent.d their
work shops, possibly both.Contracting is a conpric- tic. anong smell"ufactur.r, of men'sclothing. They bqy and cut the cloth,wand the trousers out tocmi cc'- tractor, the coatstoanother andthe veststo a third. The contractor, tailorthe cut cloth,returning the fin.
i.h.d garments to thenufacturerfor asse1ing aid selling.The lattor bars theproduction riak andpsy' the cci*ractorsa definit, fee,snufactur.rs generally Mitt fry, one typeof operation to anotner,or dividi their output,tailoring 'one oftheir garnenta and fiii- Ing out theI*aaliidsr.
Ihit little landand plant thesample c(mpinias Md Consisted mein],y ofmachinery and equipusnt, plus fund- tore and fixtures(i1y a third was in realestata, this thirdwas held by onlya handful of concerns.
IIs
- a6v,S CLOTAINI CCiPQRAflGl5Co.postt.1ince ieet and Sslsctsd Sacs.. tseenItems, in Thousand, of Dollars and in P.rca' Totat A.t*, 1926 and 1936 /
Percent of
of DoUirs Total*5
126 1936 1926 196
Assets
Islid gOVsrmseifl bonds 1349 1211 1)L leceivobi.. 1,579 1,173 45 Iliveiltory 1,056 1,296 31 1.1 Total ciuTsnt. asset. 4l. InvestasnIa 135 2 4 land and plant (net) 276 2g a Oth.rassss 126 6 1
TOTaL 3,457 3,19ó 10.)
M.abuit.L.s
ACCOW1t3 payable 719 8F1 21 Notes payable 469 41 i-i n Other cgrr.nt liablitU.. 7! 134 5 4 Total eisrr.ni liabilities 133djJ7 44 Lone-term debt 43 1 3 Other llebUitte, 1 W W Capital stodi 1,622 1,&r i.7 52
Sswplsss 453 5 13
TOTAL LIABILIlIts 100 l'O
1eem. Stsimsni. It..,
3.1.. 6,549 8,638 247 277 Officers' ccessation 627 451 1 14
23 2i. 1 1 I.cass tue. 34 27 1 1
218 135 6 3 Caidi dividends 142 82 4
CcS
ssSd
on TREC Konograpfri 15prev1ous1y cited)tabl. 1-B inAppendix .
slatemsets refer to th. end of the calendar year.
V Les, than 0.5 persist.
I Of theal1Ca.psniea in theeapleprobably rented a
I fee in an upper floor of a building in the heart of
tarn- thestropolitan diatrict. The Constituent 1and-and-plint
it... that were reported repre.ent.d these proportionsof
total classified land and plant (gross) in 1936:/
24(reported separatelyby3 cc,.) acht..ry and eqaint 49( N27 )
Fi&rnjtiiy. and fjt%urss19( 23 )
Land 8( 4_)
I
9. The Five 1dstriesFinaisciag Swell Cor05g101,
t.rial Coats In tb. induatzr bulklarge
cding to tb.. Canms of Mfactur.., r torials, and for shatlittle pr is used,-
.-hs)2 the factors ..11thg priOf tbs product;
coats cane to ice. than a fourthof tim. valu. oX
acts,the riidng fourthconsisting of overhand,
profit.. '
ft. oodticn of the S.iwantory of'. ciotM,,1
awaitacturers, as well as it. a,wg, vaij..isrpiy vj
the .ccenn.Little siiiiicinc. Can battLChS4to
rdatiss holdIngs of the variosaInventor7 it .,. ,
portodbythe i1e of U a&fsctu_zsra.utti..,,
then .t the total Inlantor7 wes classifiedin1936.
thet year the reports shsd raw aat.rial.and supp)j5
an16 percent aapsctjvs]yoftota' c
.ifi.d Inveatoxy, arid week-in-proc...and finishedgoo
10 and 36 percent reapectivsl,y.I Atabulation ptsj iiig to 10 large'Mlf$cturra in .938and 1939 sh, .aterials andaapçlje. constituting, together, o the total initoiy, andweek-in-proc... plus tjj goods tue-thirds./There are wk.d diff.,s5
tween the results thetwotabulation., due prshpto the iao1.t. reporting inthe 11 uufactner.
pie, but posslbi7 also toa di?t.r.ne Instatt dst. difference between largeand 1l"utactursr., or . a differanc. in tiperiod.
Beonase of theheterogeneous product,and the ,art- ous4'pta ofrawt.ria,5 used,it is difficultto certain the variou, pricesad coat relationship,in the flj5 qfact of 'a clothingoverthe 1926. 36 period.her, too thisps of &fact,r,differs fran tb..bre.d-b.idindustry, where boththe raw eat.- 'l.al. and the finalproduct ar, fair).7wiifor,.Th.r. is newa evidenc., hansv,r,to sliceconvincing).7 that 11- scale ' aclothing cje.experjenc changes in prjosaarid costs *ichezircised a strongeffectupon thefr profits.
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$31 $218 2.$ $142
26 127 1.4 119
19 1.5 87
15 108 1.1 41
11
9-uS -1.5 36
5 -279 -4.1 1
4 '-357 -7.4 9
! -22k -
20 32 0.5 2?
18 2 1
24 65 0.8 2
27 105 1.2 82
22
W.s4 oa ?C Nouomp8 15 (prsviouaIcit.d) Tibia 1-8 1. App..tr F. £ft.r 1s tn., s ofoftt. or lo.... fr..1.. of rsss.tat..
L/ Las. thia 0.05 p.rc..
io1ssil. price of waiting reaain.d fairly stable,f
and avsrag. hourly earning. drcp.d onlya few percent/
- but thea'. was a decline in the prices they rsc..tv.d for
their finished procts./ Second, as is evident fron
l. 5, there was no drd revision of off icera'con-
pensatiosa,A. a consequence of tb... two circiastancea
net moon, fell 50 percent &ring thi. period of general
cyclical sxpsn.ioa.
In 1933the wholesal,price of asn' asuits alaoet
doobled, outstripping the rise in raw .atsrial and labor
costs and resulting in a aods.t profit for these ..ill
Mnufacturirs, after a 1932 loss larger than that suf-
fered in any other year of the 1926-36 period.Selling
Prices fill back slightly in 1934, while labor and aate-
1111 costs proceeded to catch up; hence a further in-
crsa.. in sal.. in thatyear failed to advance profits
nerkedly.Thus thecperi.nce of "hess iU clothing
eaoufacturers apesr to corroborate the thesis that in-
IFinancing SisIi 98
dustriasr.qtairii*ga large inventory ani a relat,,,
heavy raw&tI$iS).outlay suffer earlyindepressj
prosper sarly inrecovery.
Other evidence, too, suggeststhat men' sC1otM
manufacturers enjoyed aprofitable year in1933.
of 243 manufacturers,including the larger8.3we3j
a1LerUnits, MOw. net profit amoWiting tc 2.3 ps
of seles in 1933./ ror anidentical sample of
thesenufaturera a loss of3.5percentof Miss
reported in1932,a profitof 2.7 percent in 1933,
profit of 1.3 percent in1934,23/amovement sini.
(though at a slightlyhigherleveL) to that of the
of mashcompanies studied here.
The dividendpayments made by thesample of
clothing maizafactursrswenot. particularly largeover
the 1926-36 period.They declined evenduring the 1926.
29 prosperity years.Still, 11 as theywere, they ex.
ceeded, over the 1926-36 period as a whole, therp.
its minu, the net losses of these companies in theaggre.
gate. The evidence indicates, too, that particularc.
nies in the sampl, paid out in dividendsmore than they
earned./ Officers'compensation was alarge item j
eachyear, and surprisingly stable.Practicafly none of
it was earned in 1932, and less than haltwas earned ear-
ing the1930-32period as a whole.
FURNITURE
Purchase, of furniture involv,relatively large cut.
lays on the part of consemers,andsales fluctuate sharp-. ly with changes ingeneral business. Individuality of design and fini.h isan important competitivefactor, is peci.11y for thehigher..prjcegrades of furniture.When dmaand for themore expensive productst.ii. off relative-
ly sharply, as earIngbusiness depressj,manufacturers tendto shift to cheaperdesigns andfinishes.
Ths averageasset size of thefurnitur, companies In the Presentsl. is abcut $100,00o,soms 130,000 larger than theavsrage size of theamallenterprises inthe other industrysamples,An enterpris,that, could be re- garded as fairlytypic.]., accordingto the convention out lined above,would consist ofan office housing theOwoars!The Five INdustries
and a bookkeeper,and the factory proper.If the company
manufactures upholstered rurnitur. it probably bya the
frames rsa-made; otherwise they are made in a separate,
,00deor4cing sectionof th. plant. In either case the
plant biy. th.stuffing,the coil springs andthe cover-
ing fabrics.The prts are put together on a series of
tables, sijl-artoan ass.obl.y line except for the ab-
senceof a continuous conveyor.The manufacturer may
hews a showroom at his factory, but it is not likely to
be prstsntious.If the purchasers do not actually 'visit
th. factory, selling is probably done by means of pic-
tures of the finished product and swatches of the cover-
ing upholstery fabric. Probably a large part of theout-
put is sold to th. big urban stores, whichgive it a
brand , of their own choosing. In a year like 1936
the sales of an average smell furniture company might to-
tal about $150,000, officers' compensation about $7000,
and cash dividends to the owner-officers about $3000.24/
From the infoit ion given in the income tax returns
it is not possible todistinguish with certainty between
the companies that manufacture upholstered furniture and
those thatproduce case goodssuch as dining-room and
bedroom sets, but inour sample the former are probably
in the majority. For one thing, the sample camjanies are
a11,and manufacturers of upholstered furniture tendto
operate on a 11erscale than the askers of casegoods.
Second, the upholstered furniture manufacturers are most
often located in th. urban c.nters, while the case goods
companies are situated mainlyinthe rural areas, and of
the companies in our sample about one-third were in cit-
ies of 1,000,000 population or more, about two-thirdsin
cities of 50,000 or more.fIt has been estimated by
one who is fillarwiththe furniture industry/ that
in the presentsimple the upholstered furniture manufac-
turers probably outeuered the case goodscompanies two
tocile.
The manufacture of furniture, especiallyof thehigh-
er grades, is fairly concentratedin five principal con-
tars: Grand Rapids, Michigan; Jamestown, New York; Evans-
ville, Indiana; Chicago, Illinois; and HighPoint, North
Carolina. Thesecenters achieved their dominant position
aaiyears ago and havesince maintainedit, although
there is s evidence that the msnufacture of furniture
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abilities) and a sisabis volume ofcurrent assets (about.
two-third, of total asset.), as is evidentfrca Table 6.
Their large inventory reflect. the aids variety of their
products, and the sue of their receivabi..indicates ox-
tens.tve credit sales.
In furniture manufacture the cost ofmaterials/
is a relatively ieportant iten, constituting about 45
percent of the valu, of products.For cue goods coepa-
nies 1i.r is the principal raw material itma,but for
upholstered furniturenufactur.r., which pradoninate in
ths present .ese, thecovering fabricsrepresent the
bulk of the raw material cost.Persons familiar with the
industry assert thatinthis field of furniture asnufac-
turethree-fourths of the outlays for raw material. and
supplies goes for piece good., end this observation is
supported b7 a ccuj*rison of census data on the raw ma-
t.riels cost of furniturenufacturers,exclusive of
their outlays on wood,with the totaloutput of the up-
holstuy wire-spring industry.Lebor costs account for
about a third of ths value of products, sad the remaining
fifth represents overhead and profits.Wootkorking ma-
chinery is exten.ivslyused in the manufacture of case
good., and in making frame, for upholsteredfurniture,
but since moat of the csnies in our saeple produced
upbolatered furniture and bout fran.. rea-made, and
since woouiidngmachinery hasa carative1y long life,
the.cbths cost for the seepis a. a group we. relative-
ly
Almost half of the gros. land and plantofthe 1
furniture cpani.. inthe prssent .l. consisted of
buildings, and such of the remainder was in machinery and
eaipment. In 1936 the total classified land and plant
(gross) wes dividsd a. follows:/
5&lldtn(, 6S (rsjiortsd aspsrately by 36 Co..) b.cPItn.,7 and .i1t 35( 61
3( S 53
Land 13( 31
Nrofifths of the inventory holdings of these compa-
nies representedfinishedgoods, the b.lance being shout
evenLy divid.d between raw materials andwork-in-process.
The accetqing figures .hthe 1936 breakdai of the
total dassitied inventory of this ..1..fThere
were several changesinthese proportions over the period4â
T.bI.s 7 - 66 F*I1?U1E cOCR*?TC11$.luct.d
I.,St.t..sIt.... 1926-36I (o11ir fig.,.. 1.
F,,,ancsng SraaLL Corportso,,s
5swtsrtai$ 2(r,porl.d .sp.r.t..lj bj 32 cc..)
uttii-pr.cI.. 27C 26 )
ptith.4Sod$4.0( a )
Suppit.. 5 C )
1926-36, but the onl.y ones that appsar to be siiificsnt
were an increase inthe finishedgoods cacnsnt and a
decreas, in the . teria1. cocnent. Work-in-proc...
iecreas.d in relation to tot.]. inventory, butseof
thisIncrease is probably sxp].1iiid by a nor. cl.t.
reporting of this it...
The 1926-28 declins in the profits of11 furni-
tuz'. wufactursrs, evident ftc. Table 7, app.srs to he
q1ainsd bys f.0 in .q].Ung pricesnot fuUy cc.-
psnsat,d for by d.cUnss in piece gceds and pric-
e.j,IThe stf sot of changing price and cost relation.
arthg 1929the Isdiatel.y foUcving years is oh-
soured by a larg. andctrscrdtnsiy capitalgainrecorded
in 1929,probably by a ccatq in th. smaple which di.-





1924 11.175 639 174
1929 12,160 7 182
1926-29 &5.116
1930 9.338 613 177
1931 7.397 522 160
1932 4.666 339 131.
1930-32 flill 1
1933 h557 333 132 al
1,34 6,07s 34.4 121.ii
1935 7,968 379 110ii
1936 10,04.9 4.75 132 63
1933-34. 29669
$67 $374 3.% $
245 2.6 156
46 232 2.1 16?
155 213 1.5
69 -31.3 -3.4 212
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mously in value ./ This opu'e.tion seems to have had the
effect of boosting dividends, officers' compensation md,
of course, incons taxes in l92, therebydecreasing the
nst inc exclusive of capital gains and losses. It was
probably because of this windfall gain that officers'ccc'-
pensation was maintained at an unusually high level in
1930 particularly, and also in 1931, thereby.Uth8 the
net lossesreported in those years.But the large net
loss in 1932 can be explained only by the very small vo]-
of business.Th. fact that these companies' opera-
tions continued to be unprofitable through 1935 may be
explained by the relativelyodest recovery in their vol-
une of business, in conjunction with increases in 1uier
prices and average hourly earnings/ and probable in-
creases in piece goods prices.
Cash dividends for the present sample declined in
1927 and 1928, but rose abruptly in 1929, presumably be-
cause of the windfaU gain. Dividends fell sharplyin
the years of eyclical contraction but in 1932 they were
still as high as they had been in l9, thus reflecting
the ccntiaaing effect of the large 1929 capital gain. By
1933,huvever, ths effect of this capital gain sesme to
have disappeared from the cash dividend series. Although
dividendsincreased in 1934 it was not until 1936 that
they returned to their pre-depression Level.
The manufacture of brick and tile/ has been un-
dergoing a secular d.cline oier the past several decades.
This tndu.t.ry attained an all-tine productionpeak, in
teima of con-brick equivalents, early in the present
century./ Sinc, then the d.e1opment of competing ma-
terials, particularly structural steel, has cut down the
market for con brick, the most isportsnt product of
the industry.Also, since 1927, thisfield of manufac-
ture has been strongly affected by the lag of construc-
tion activity.The financial atateaents ofthe present
group of small, incorporated manufacturers of clay and
stone products, lsrgely brick and tile1 reflectthis
sluin the industry.Theirsales began to drop after
1928, fallingoff more than those of theother sample
groups; in cariscn with the other groups their depres-
sion losses were larger, inrelation to sales, andinS Financiiif Si,aii Corp0,,0,,
44
1936 theirvoliof businessindicated a lees
recovery.
£ pri11brick plant thatmight be regarded as
or lesstypical of thoseincluded in th. prsw
would have totalassets of about $75,000. In a yeaaica
as 1936officers' 0)Iflsationwould average $5(XJc),and
withdrawals in theform of cash dividends would IM
mostas high.2/
Brick-aiidflg requires ztensive pbyaical.
and a large nusherofworkers;the .abor is
tirely unkm.d. Theplants are usually located n
clay deposits, on theoutskirts of a awl cityend
the general vicinityofa large urbancenter.Thesi
clay is taken to a storagebin,from which it i
toa hopper on the top floorof a machine building,p
the hopper the green clay works dn through various
andmillingoperations to thebrick-making ma.
chine.When the clay rges from thi8 I4chine, pre$$nd
into bricks, it is conveyed to drying rooms, frsqu.nuy
by hand.Cice dried, to. bricksareplacedin____
again by head, and baked for several days, after which
they are sorted and removed to storage sheds. Del 1verj.s
are mad. bytruck.
Moat brick and tileproducts are distributed ina
local market.There ar. several reasons for this local-
i: demand is geogra*iica1ly widespread; the necessary
raw materials andunsktU.d laborcan be found in most.
part..of the country; tot product ii heavy and bulky in
relation to its value.Paving brick andsome types of
fac, brick are ancception, their essential raw material
being found onlyin Certain parts of the country.9(Be-
cause of the oca1 market for most brick and tile prod-
uctsthenufacturing establia1ents in theindnstry
seldcm reach large proportions.Even the consolidations
and mergers-of which there hay, been quitea f.w - have
not resulted in a marked increas.in the size of the pro-
dacing unit.
The manufacture and saleof brickand tileare char-
actezirad by a strongseasonal variation.With the ad-
vent of cold weather,'i"ing of the clay and burning of
thegreen bricks becomeincreasingly difficult. MWq














1" U Cash dividends
/ based on NW ,raph15 (prevIcu1y cited) Ta1e1-b In ppeia F.
These atatenents refer to the end of tnecalnndar yar.
























ash ond overro'eflt bonds $645 4461
kceivsbles 1,501 1,013
InventOry 1,055 71
total current assets 3.,j
69 221 Invetjasnte
Land and plant (net) 3,533 2,69.
Other asset. 161 61
TOTAL ASSETS 6. 5.16.'
acoiatpsy.ble 539
Notes payabls 644 .2i.






Capital stock 3,1b9 3,C6t
Surplus 2,32! 5)1.
TOTAL LIABILITISS !.i2&
sUfh. Fivt Iedvstrses 45
,onth3 Also the demand for structural clayproducts
gaUs, of course with the winterslackening of building
cti,ity. Production holds toa highlevel in the euer
and early till; itdeclines withthe approach of winter
and reaches a lpoint in February.Shipments fluctuate
1.35shu'ply,but tcal a aimila' timing. Finished
stocks fluctuate the least; they areattheir peak (lea.
than 10 psrcent shove theirannualaverage) in Noveer
andDsceeber,,/ the balance-sheet datefor moat of the
_____in the presentsample.
table S - 70 STONë AND CLAY CCRPCRATIONS:Eospo1i.e Balance
t andS.1ecLed Incese Stat.caent Itcea, In1h3uiand3 Of
DoLlari and In Percent ef I.ta1 Assot.a1926and1I3b /FsirnusciAg Sia1L Coror.j
46
frow Table 8, the financisi
of the prstsapli ofP'sctur.rs j
by a rsiatii*]7lai'gi in land
U ..otmtof pyable, and an anousivo1
sales .r.iyequal totot.*lassets. In sdditio0 toa
tory buildI.t(Vith bUSYchinsI7, bz'jck..1r
priass cri.. claydeposits. drying sheds*114
kilni- Sinc, thebulk of the rev aat.rial consist.
green clay, aniten included w.d.r landand
payableare iee]l.Inventol7 is aisablenot .
cauis of the rawt.rial itbut becius. of
finished goods.
The breakdoen for 1936 of the total clasajfj.4
and plant(gross) of thsse snailstone-clay ceps,j
541dt. 1,0% (r.port.d 3.parmt.1y b3 Mc1ry n .quLpI1,5( Pe*Ltwea.dflsrs 1(-
14( S1)
furtherillustratestheir reliance on buildings,
try and land.3/Althoughth. land coon.nt is lar's
for this 1ndutria1 sa.ple than for any of the other
groups studied,it i. neverthelessunderstated,bsca
depletable assets wsre reported in the call other csps.t
sssstscategory./ Thus aost of theclaydeposits, is.
pec{a'lly those that sers being currently .in.d, have be.
Classified a.other capitalassets; thisiten, W*tch s
reported by 55 canies in the .Ie, ted toao
of the total gross land andplant.Itis pr.
ably safe to say, therefore, that as enchasa fourth of
the gross land and plant of .heae ccapnies consisted.f
land, including not only land for thebuildings but also
clay deposits,and possibly even coaldeposits.
As was alrssaention.4, the bulk of the invuntcq
holdings of these coepaniesconsisted of finished good..
The d"Il.r of rev .at.riai. was not usgs, the claygsnsrally being aliveda. needed.There sas sow
rk-in-procsas, and aan enount of supplies. The
1936 breakdoen of thetotal classified inventory$ U
follows. Thesestatenentsrefer, in general, to the
ktr1sls11% (r.portsd"p.r.e.1 by 19 cc..) IOf*-la-pgcss10( .1.1, ) ?Mtabsdg.o4$73( 39 ) SuppU.p 6( 26)-
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n4 of the calendar year, when brick plant operations are
]ack and stocks of finished goods are at their peak.f
Th. data available on the cost and price relation-
ship. of the stone-clay eowpanies differ in an isportant
respect rye those for the other industries. The coat of
aiterials constitutes about a third of th. 'value of prod-
ucts in stc(isc1&7, butthere is acne question whether
this it, as reported in the Census of Kanufactures,in-
cludsa dsplstion, which in Table 9 ii shown togetherwith
depreciation.Fuel constitutesabout half of the raw
saterial coat and, when derived fron coal,deposits, way
.].,o figure in the depletion charge.Although payrolls
are11*i.portant cost itea - wore than two-fifths of the
value of products - data on average hourlyearnings in
this industry are scarce for the yearsbefore 1932.
The 1929 sales of await stone-claycoepanies, in cur-
rent dollars, were about the sane asin 1926, yet profits
in 1929 stood at scarcely wore than afifth of their 1926
9 - 70sicliahID CLAY)IP0RATI0NS
.tsct.1 1acStats It. 1926-36
(Duller f1irsn In thoiasu)
e.g ..taIa.
$1k.sd on 1IMonsgu'sp6 15 (provtou*17 dud) TibI.1-0 in App.ndii F.
V£fl.1*Ct.azs$. ..aclustvs of profits or kisses fro. ..l.. of'
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1926 $7,605 $5% $2S7 .85 $490 6.l.% $312
1927 0.056 567 319 72 391 1.9 106
1921 0,199 550 344 68 507 6.2 406
1929 7.653 527 357 30 106 1.4 134
1926-29 311.3 321 1.1 1.2w
1930 6,354 539 347 15 -113 -1.6 136
1931 4,098 386 313 7 -390 -9.5 141.
1932 2,11.3 263 226 -603 -32.3 68
1930-321.2,565

















1936 4,561 34,3 193 75 267 5.9 264




















level (Table 9). The cause appears tohave ben* di]j, in selling prices betw.eA the twoyears./ we.11WtindICYin 1929 tar WIllrates to behigher tj those prenI1-'* in 1926 it3irob.b1.voffset bytj drop in the pric. of cod.2Z/The incrsasein ösprsj. stion frcs 1926 to 1929 WIaoffset bydecreas.. j,
cers' cospinsaticla and in incot.z.s.
Increasing net losses charsctirisedth,.s'.1930. 32.Even these relativelysuccessful ill
went into the red in1930, and by 1932reported gate lossof 32 cents forever7 dollar ofseles.s.ii ing Prices fell concui'rsntlYwith sales,but thelattep dr3pQthe seze sharply,indicatinga declinein ua. physical vo]. ofbusiness.f
In 1933, shenxq industriesenjoyed atleasta dsst upturn inbusiness, the *il.*of the clay c,.niea studied huewere evenlower thanira 1932. The 1933 net losswas only halfthat of thepreceding year, however, becauseselling pricesstarted upeardin 1933, wege rats.lagged bhiPd inturning urd/ d.pi'soiatiøn chargesand officers'conp.nsaticncontimsd to fall.The sharp Increas,in sate.that occurredin 1936, in conjunctionwith a relativelystablepoduction- coat structure,resulted Ina profit twoand a halftlse8 the 1929 netjnc, eventhough officers'
ccapenaetion s were thantwo-third. againas high as ithad beenin the precedingyear.
The dividendpolicy of the.&11stone-clayco*- nies In thepresent .amplsappear,to haveresulted in considerableliquidation ofassets overthe 1926-36pe- riod as aWiols Intheprosperous lets19)'s theydi.. bursed thbulk of theirnet into.,as cash dividends. When Jncfell in1929, cashdividendswere cut sharp- ly, butthe subsequentlosseswere notacccspwii.dbyfur thu reduction,in dividendsuntil 1932.In otherwords, these ccspanies
intaineda fairlyhigh rate ofdividend distributionin theearlyyear. of thedepression.In 1933, onth. otherhand, theentire 70conpanies inthe present slepaid outonly $36,000as cash dividends. In 1936,afteroperations had£g&thbsc profitibis,
cash dividends
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come:th. net losses incurred in 1930-34 wiped out prac-
ticaUy all of the net profits earned in 1926-29 and1935-
36, whereas the cashdividends disbursed by these 70 corn-
paniss over the slewso yearsreached practically 2mu-
lion dollars.As will be shown in the next chapter, this
difference is to be accounted for largely by a liquids-
ticn of both current end fixed assets.
MAHIN T0L
For the last two centuries machin, tools have played
a key role in the dsve1oasnt of industry. The perfecting
of the steen engine, for rn.ple, mae dependent upon bor-
jag and turning machines capable of finishing cylinders
and their pistons to close-fitting dimensions.The prin-
ciple at interchangeable parts, to cite a more recent il-
luatration, could not be applied to the problems of large-
cal. manufactur. until various metalworking machines had
been d.irslopsd which could finish off a given part in any
quantity, always with identical dia"nsions.In the pres-
ent d.csds th. key rol. of the machine tool industry has
been enhanced even further by the demands of mar.The
manufactureof all kinds of armamentis dependent upon
machine tools, and the industry has been booming since
the middle 1930'., originaUy from its exportbusiness -
since ailitaiy preparations were stepped up abroad some
years ago - and now from domestic demand.
Thechine tool industry is an important indicator
of business trends. f This sensitivenessto cyclical
forces isdueto the fact that machine tools are sold
largely to manufacturers ofproducer goods, and reach
virtually every sesnt of our industrial economy.Ma-
chinetool companies make the metalworkingmachinery
whichinturn is used by co.panies asnifacturingspecial
thisti7 .achthss.The automobile industry demands new
jigs and fixtures and possibly even nmachine tools in
it. aiv,usl retooling for nmodels, and this industry
aba. absorbed about a third of the output ofmachine
tool.inprewar pwars.In this portion of their output,
and in that used by manufacturers of articlessuch as re-
frigsrstor. and sewingchin.s, the aichine tool compa-
nies ar.relatively close to the ultimate consmar;in
the rest, however, they areseveral stages renoved from
the conr market.Fivia,scijst' Snail Corporat,0a1
The wide separationof alarge part of matht output fren the ultimate consi' market meansthat changes in cs'r are swiftlytrantt.d this Industry.fIn aperiod of cyclicalcontr&ctioa
it is g the first to curtailoperations,and it .
fers a sharper decline in business than do otheriiidus.
tries.The convers, is true in aperiod of cycljca
pinsion.
c&in tools are of many type. andvarieties.The aost cn are turning machines (lathes),whichshave off the ..t..l,and drillingachines are thensx
n'erous group;/ other t,pssal'siIltngmachine.,
honing and lapping machines, whichpolish th metalsur.. face, and, according tos definition., forging aa. chines and153O5,Although machine toolsmakepo3ait). standardised,largs-scal. production, their facturs is specialized andill-sca1e.As a result ofpstet rightsand the pr'dne.inance oftechnicians andakifl.d laborers In this field,machine tool mafactursrs con-. stjtutea clo.ely-keitdostrj.1aristocracy.The a- tiana].Eachjne Tool. Builders£ssocjitja,the trade asso- ciation of the industi'y,containsfewer than 200 *rs, The Census of1nufactures, underitsbroader dSfiitj. of machine tools,reported less than 300such est.b1j.i.. monts for 1937.
Closely bound up withmachine tool ufacti', is the Production ofaccessoriesusedon machinetool. - checks,vise,, attaciments,dies, jigs,ii cutting tools and too],holders.A .aclunetool Producercon-. tracte out tothe.. accessoryWgafactur5 a larg,part of his work,and incidentaj,jpshareswith then th. peak loads in theindustry.








u of output of a machine tool companyrepresents value
.ddsd, andthus raw materialpurchases in theindustry
ar. not large.Th. most importantrawmaterials are gray-
iron casting., carbonandother steel, cold-rolled steel
and pig-iron./
The psc'ili&iti.. of the industryare reflected in
the financialstructure of the companies in the present
sample. A. is n in Table 10, these companies' assets
are about evenly divided between current and fixeditems,
sbi. 10 - 115 IAO4INE TOOLIPORA?IO5StCospozit. Balance
isst a' t Selected bee.. Ststas.M. items, in Thousands of






f3..sidOsTIOtC PonOrs*1 15 (previously cited) Tablei.. g,ppfljx p.
Th...*ateats rotor to the end or th.cai.r.dar year.
ifisis then 0.5 p.re.nt.
I
1926 1936 1926 1936
Assets
Cash sadvsrus.nt bonds $517$1,045 71 131
I-Isedemblem 1,3O i,tlO 1? 20
1.793 1,45? 24 19
Totalcurrent sss.ts 61 65
Inv.stnsnts 295 1 4
Landsodplant (nit) 3,159 ),201 45 19
Other ssssts 465 395 6 5
TOTAL A5SS 7.525 e.c'36 ii
Liabilities
Aecowfts psb10 723 995 12
Iot.s psyebls 751 6iJ. 10 5
Othsr cerr.mt lIabilities 195 46 3 7








Capitalstock 4,4C4 4,720 59 59






S Officers' cemp.naation 1,O51,16 14 14




















whiti their currant debts .aount to only about a
of their total l.ittIS.Afiflual 51l,Siare
third again as large as total assets.
Machinery and squint accounted for two..tJij41
th. totl clauifisd land and plant (gross) ofthe., 11thinetOOl andaccessory in 1936,
th cl.t. br..kd for that year beinga.
&41dLIJ. 25% (rsp.ie.d .IPU't.Iy by51 Co..) th.ry snd 65(a
114 ) inLLw'adtiir.3($
Lwid a
The.. figurestestify to Ui. isportance,jjth
try of heavy and costly setalworlcin,genchin.zy, and to
th. tact that a larg. nuaber of the ll enterprise3
rent their factory building..
Inventory holding. are divided faiz1evenjy aao(*g 14W ilals, WO2ki1IP1oCes. and finishedgoods, ascaj beseen frthefoUin,g breakdoim oftotal cl.aujfj,j
invsntoiyfor 1936./In this industry thewoir..p.
t.r1s1 30(rCport.d PipSrat.ip 69 ci.) brk..je.r,,s.. 30(
) ?1nIedo.,I. %( a .SMpplI.p 4(a
)
is. cooent is larger, inrelation to totalclassified inventory, than inany of th. othertour, andeven so, its relative aagnitudeis probablyunderstat.d by the foregoing figures..2I
Value of productsin the nachinetoolindustry is distributeda]aost. eaaL1ysaeng ges, rawteria1. (inciriding fuel)and overhead plusprofits.The produc- tion of aM4j tool is a long Jobrsquirjg ilciU.d hands endexpensive enchinery.72/Ths "feastorfaeine' nature of theindustrycauses, however,a very irid. ten- porsl variationin thepr portion ofthe value of prod- ucts that isavaaableforoverhead and profit..
I formationon selling pricesand costs for the ma- chine tool, Upis scanty,not only becaus,the ca- flies ar li and closelyheld but alsobecause their product £s andtheirraw materialsare constantly cbangingThe onlyfactor on shichusable data are avail-The Five I'udustrjes
ab].. is laborcost,asrepresented by average hourly earnings./Raw material costsand selling pricesde- pend an the Particular typesof machines produced, and it would bunjustifiabl, to offer estimatespurporting to represent the corporationsstudied here.
The 5,flsitjVefl.35 of machinetool companies to cy- clical forces is clearly illustratedin Table U.The
1927 contraction in genera3. busines,was not particularly severe, yetit is easily recognized inthese companies' netincome figure.:profits in 1927were only half of what they had been theyear before.The reaction to the
depression of the 1930' s was bothprompt and intense.
Sisable losses appeared in 1930.By 1932 thelose per dollar of sales was larger than theprofit in any of the
prosperity years covered, and the volumeof business was not enchre than a fourth of theeakit reached in
1929.By 1934, hever, the losses haddwindled to the
vaiziahing point, andin the nexttwo years there were
comfortable profit margin..
bl.11 -US i*C1I1TOOL CCRft*A?1016
$.1.et.d !ncSt*t..smt It..., 1926-36 if
(Dollar flgiar.sin tho.aM.)
Offlc.r.' Dso.lstio - !e& N.t In-
IUESal.. Co.çee-& Ds- -
saUrniciet.
1926 $9,778 $1,055 $311 $60 $332 3.d $205
1927 9,550 1,060 326 52 174 1.8 131
1920 11,671 1,191 376 66 517 4.4 210
1929 15,232 1,456 410 131 1,211 8.0 338
1926-29 66,231i.2a 2!i2.
1930 9,81.3 1.149 382 32 -279
1931 6.509 873 341. 15 -503





1933 ,,793 562 259 24 -21,8 -5.2 35
1934 7,211 700 21.0 46 -16 -0.2 70
1935 8,702 81,1 21,2 II 294 3.3 105
1936 11,665 1,146 21,1 1 1.30 3.7 373
1933-36 32.651 3.257
ifBased ca TINs..gr.pk15(prsvlosi.1cited) Table 1-inApp.six F.
W After taise, ae8slulv.of profitsorto..s.fr.. ..l.. of
real ..tst..S 54 Fiw,cinSealS Corporatj0
The 1930 loss was 50usable and sdenthat itr rants special consideration, cular3.y in ot
factthat sales in that year, although conaidery
er than in the preceding75a1 1larger than in1926, 1927 or1935-7earsefl these empeid..we2'*intp.
black. It is likely that a considerableplZte Of
19) in earnings -though weare unable to det.i,
.&ch due to a divergence in the movement.of selJ.
mi prices andterial costs.Another part is
attributable to theint.nanc.of depreciationan oj
cer.' censstion at their 1928 levels(1930 sal..,
far below thou, in 1928) and to enincreas,thaver.
hourl.y wage.in the industry.( Dpreciationcharg.j off by the cani.. utudi.d here feLtonly slightlyfric. 1929 to 1930, and was higherinthese two year.thin
aiother part of the periød covered. SisHr1y,ccmp...
sation of officers, althoughdown Considerablyfrom its
1929 peak, was higher in1930than in any otheryeare
the period except 1928 and 1929.Thusth. abruptand heavy loss of 19% was probably due largelytothe
flexibility of labor costs and ofcertainoverhejit Ofit moy have been caused by inventory1oaae and breakinselling prices, but it isimpossibleeven to e.. tiaate theamount of these.
The positionof machine tootcoepanies was very fa-
vorabi. as early as 1936,several years beforethe out- breakof the current war.Inthat year sales,as indi- cated by the present sample,were highertheninany ear- lieryear of th. period except 1928and1929, and way. practically ashigh as theyhad been in 1928. Also the 1936 netincoms, onboth atotal and aper-dollar-Of. bajs, we, outrankeonly bythat of 1928and 1929 The findingthat in 1936net inc wasscme,at below the 1928 figure,althoughsales inthe twoyear.wore .1- most identical,way b. largelyexplained by thefact that average hourly earningswereat their U-yearpeak in 1936, Rises inram material costsmay round out theex- planation, but thisitme is not likelyto have been so important as theothers.
Aecialtabulation,prepared by theTreasury-epA Income Tax StufortheSecurities andkcchange Coami.- don, wake, itpossible to showfor the years 1936-39 the financialcperaticns of anidentical sample compris- ing 62 orthe3.18li machinetoo], manufacturersdis.
IW Ie.. on Tabi. 0-6 tn list. liook(..efootnot. 16 of Ch.pt.r 1).
£ft.r tswo.. tsus. end .xclu.ive of profit. Cr losses frut.. or
reel stet..
CUSSedabove.The data on thea].1er sample, presented
in Table 12, revealthat the 1938 slump was keenly felt
despite war preparations throughout the world. Sale afell
off sharply, net profits turned into net losses, and both
officer.' compensation and cash dividends declined.The
nt year saw considerable recovery, but not back to 1936
levels. )ver the four years as a whole net income amount-
ed to less than 1 percent of sales.
The 1936-39 movement of sales of these 62 cpanias
paralleled closely that of the sales of a sample of 18
large sacb4ne too]. companies (with assets averagingabout
$5,000,000), registered with the Securities andchange
Cisiion. These large manufacturers, however,succsed-
d in reporting a profit(after income taxes)in every
year of the period.Ci the otherhand, a sample of 6
large msr'facturere of machine tools (with asset. averag-
ing about 34,000,000), not registered with theSecurities
andchange Comeiseicri, sustained a not loseriot only in
1938 but also, apparently because of specialdeductions,
in 1939.2/
It is somewhat surprisingthat. such a thrivingin-
thstiy should have the extraordinarily meagrenet income
per dollar of sales that isrevealed in Tables 11 and 12.
It&st be remeabered, however,that the net income shown
her. iscalculated after deduction of off ic.r& compen-

















19$ 3.201 3% 6 -96 -2.9 34
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conelmi, inwhiCh ths officsr mrs aimo tb.
psstion iiatsaU7 sdJuat.d to tb. £'t1.b1. avsil*hl. for dt.tri"
ma cashdiYidd' ii not adssidsrst. ti
of ths ccsnisin thin1s isis .
c.ioriSS, adivision iniida ths profiti'iI
roulSi thin ths pro&ct1onof suchaton.buUt jtiI and boron